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CONTINUING THE
WHITE-COLLAR
UNIONIZATION MOVEMENT:
IMAGINING A PRIVATE
ATTORNEYS’ UNION
Kimberly Y. Chin

I.

Introduction

“Such equality [between employers and employees] is the central
need of the economic world today. It is necessary to insure a wise
distribution of wealth between management and labor, to maintain a full
flow of purchasing power, and to prevent recurrent depressions.”
— Senator Robert Wagner (1934)1
“These law firms are large, wealthy and powerful institutions that
generally don’t like to talk about how they work. So when you proffer
information, people get excited. They are peeking behind the curtain. . . .
We are moving in the direction of greater and greater transparency.”
— David Lat, Founder of AboveTheLaw.com (2009)2
Beginning in 2008, turmoil rocked the legal industry. In January
2008, Cadwalader Wickersham & Taft became the first major New York
law firm to conduct attorney layoffs in anticipation of the economic


Litigation Associate, Boornazian, Jensen & Garthe; J.D., Boston College Law
School (2010); B.A., Wellesley College (2005). The Author would like to thank her
family for their constant support and Professor Thomas Kohler of Boston College Law
School for his comments, guidance, and advice. A previous version of this Article won
third place in the 2009-2010 Louis Jackson Memorial National Student Writing
Competition in Labor and Employment Law.
1. 78 CONG. REC. 3,443 (1934) (statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in 1 NLRB,
LEGIS. HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT OF 1935, at 15 (1949).
2. Rachel M. Zahorsky, David Lat: Gossip at Law, A.B.A. J. (Sept. 23, 2009, 2:03
AM), http://www.legalrebels.com/posts/david_lat_gossip_at_law/.

77

1

CHIN_Formatted_Finalv8

78

4/11/2012 7:31 PM

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:1

downturn.3 Since then, over 5,800 attorneys employed at the nation’s
top-tiered law firms have been laid off.4 Additionally, private law firms,
in response to this new economic reality, restructured associate
compensation, reduced or eliminated bonuses, or instituted voluntary
departure plans or sabbatical programs to encourage associates to leave.5
In 2008 alone, several major law firms collapsed.6
The legal industry’s responses to the difficult economic climate left
attorneys with low morale, anxiety, frustration, and unhappiness.7 The
majority of associates were troubled by their firm’s lack of transparency
regarding financial issues and layoffs.8 Laid-off associates reported being
shocked at the news of their firings.9 In fact, some associates became
3. Peter Lattman, Cadwalader Laying Off 35 Lawyers, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Jan.
10, 2008, 10:23 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2008/01/10/cadwalader-laying-off-35lawyers/ (explaining that the firm was responding to “market developments with a
number of initiatives” including “targeted personnel reductions.”).
4. Top Ten by Total Layoffs, LAW SHUCKS, http://lawshucks.com/layoff-tracker/
(last visited Oct. 21, 2011). The top ten firms in attorney layoffs are, in alphabetical
order: Allen & Overy, Baker & McKenzie, Clifford Chance, DLA Piper, Eversheds,
Holland & Knight, Latham & Watkins, Linklaters, Orrick, and White & Case.
5. See, e.g., Susan Dominus, $80,000 for a Year Off? She’ll Take It!, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 13, 2009, at A1 http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/13/nyregion/13bigcity.html
(describing Skadden’s effort to cut costs by offering all associates “the option of
accepting a third of their base pay to not show up for work for a year.); Elie Mystal,
Pillsbury: Let’s Try This Whole ‘Voluntary Departure’ Thing One More Time, ABOVE
LAW (May 18, 2009, 11:21 AM), http://abovethelaw.com/2009/05/pillsbury-lets-try-thiswhole-voluntary-departure-thing-one-more-time/ (stating that Pillsbury has offered two
voluntary departure programs); Eilene Zimmerman, Chill of Salary Freezes Reaches Top
Law Firms, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2009, at BU11 (discussing associate salary freezes and
the move toward merit-based bonus systems).
6. See Niraj Chokshi et al., Struggling Heller Calls It Quits, RECORDER (Sept. 26,
2008),, http://www.law.com/jsp/ca/PubArticleCA.jsp?id=1202424812918; Martha Neil,
Thelen Leaders Seek Vote to Dissolve, Hope to Close By Dec. 1, A.B.A. J. (Oct. 28, 2008,
3:08 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/thelen_leaders_seek_vote_to_dissolve_hope
_to_close_by_dec_1/; Debra Cassens Weiss, Thacher Proffitt Announces Expected
Dissolution, A.B.A. J. (Dec. 22, 2008, 8:30 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/is_tha
cher_proffitt_dissolving_before_christmas/.
7. See Rachel Breitman, A Year to Forget, AMERICANLAWYER.COM. (Aug. 1, 2009),
http://www.law.com/jsp/tal/PubArticleTAL.jsp?id=1202432587499 (reporting, among
other things, that 83 percent of respondents to the 2009 American Lawyer annual survey
of midlevel associates reported medium or high anxiety about losing their jobs).
8. See id.; Ross Todd, Fading Away, AMERICANLAWYER.COM (Aug. 1, 2009),
http://www.law.com/jsp/tal/PubArticleTAL.jsp?id=1202432587424 (“In a year filled
with disappointment, how the bad news was delivered and how departures were
characterized mattered.”).
9. David Lat, Will Work for Dinner at Nobu, N.Y. OBSERVER (Jan. 22, 2008, 10:46
PM), http://www.observer.com/2008/will-work-dinner-nobu (quoting a laid-off
Cadwalader associate as saying, “I thought I was being called in for my year-end review.
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aware of potential layoffs only after noticing that top firm managers and
human resources directors had reserved the majority of the firm’s
conference rooms.10 Other associates blasted their law firms for failing to
distinguish between layoffs that were performance-based and those that
were economically driven, noting that nobody seemed to know what
factors went into the decision-making process.11
Given the still-rebounding legal market and the secrecy that
characterized the employment decisions at many of the nation’s top law
firms during the height of attorney layoffs, this Article imagines the
formation of private attorney labor unions as a possible solution. Part I
briefly discusses the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, the primary
piece of legislation that governs employees’ right to organize and
collectively bargain, focusing primarily on who is covered with
particular attention placed on the inclusion of professional employees.
. . . I totally wasn’t expecting it.”).
10. E.g., id. (reporting that associates at Cadwalader became suspicious when the
firm’s executive director and head of Associate Development and Recruitment reserved
an entire floor of conference rooms); David Lat & Elie Mystal, Nationwide Layoff Watch:
Latham & Watkins Is Going for It, ABOVE LAW (Feb. 25, 2009, 10:32 AM), http://abovet
helaw.com/2009/02/nationwide_layoff_watch_latham_1.php (predicting layoffs at
Latham & Watkins when associates noticed that conference rooms were reserved for
Friday, February 27th in the firm’s New York, Chicago, Washington, D.C., Los Angeles,
and San Francisco offices). Latham & Watkins later laid off 190 associates and 250
nonlegal staff, including paralegals, across many of its United States offices on Friday,
February 27, 2009. David Lat, Nationwide Layoff Watch: Latham Cuts 440 (190
Associates, 250 Staff), ABOVE LAW (Feb. 27, 2009, 8:17 AM),
http://abovethelaw.com/2009/02/nationwid
e-layoff-watch-latham-cuts-440190associates-250-staff/; Richard Lloyd, Latham to Cut
190 Associates, 250 Staff, AM. LAWYWER DAILY (Feb. 27, 2009, 8:24 AM),
http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2009/02/official-latham-to-cut-190associates250-staff-.html.
11. Todd, supra note 8. The article explains:
So what did associates perceive as bad firm conduct? Most were
skeptical—hostile, even—about cuts that firms labeled as purely
performance-related. The downturn left most firms with less work
and lower-than-normal attrition. So to most associates, layoffs were
understandable. But sending exiting colleagues into a terrible
economy while tarnished with poor performance reviews drew
associates’ ire.
Id. In the wake of impending layoffs, one associate, who was later laid off from Pillsbury
Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP described the firm atmosphere as “tense,” remarking that
“[p]eople tried to get clarification as to what would be taken into consideration in layoff
decisions.” Drew Combs, A Different Sort of Lawyer, AMERICANLAWYER.COM (Aug. 1,
2009), http://www.law.com/jsp/tal/PubArticleTAL.jsp?id=1202432565393&slreturn=1.
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Part II introduces an understanding of white-collar professionals as a
distinct economic class, highlighting specifically its similarities and
differences with traditional blue-collar workers. This Part then uses this
understanding of white-collar professionals to describe and justify the
white-collar unionization movement, while also noting the formation of
unions in other professional industries. Proceeding upon the
understanding that private law attorneys, as white-collar professionals,
possess a legitimate interest in organizing, Part III identifies and
responds to common objections to the formation of attorney labor
unions. Finally, Part IV suggests that current conditions are ripe for the
creation of private attorney labor unions and addresses the practical
considerations associated with forming such unions.

II.

The Legislation Governing the Right to Organize
and Collectively Bargain

This Part provides a brief overview of the National Labor Relations
Act of 1935 (NLRA or the “Act”). It first situates the Act historically,
noting its role as part of an overall national policy to ensure economic
stability and growth. It then explores the evolution of the types of
employees to which the NLRA applies, specifically focusing on the
inclusion of professional employees and the extent to which Congress
contemplated the Act’s application to attorneys.

A. The National Labor Relations Act of 1935: The Wagner Act
The paramount legislation that governs the rights of employees to
unionize and collectively bargain is the NLRA, also known as the
Wagner Act. It encourages “the practice and procedure of collective
bargaining” and protects “the exercise by workers of full freedom of
association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their
own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of
their employment.”12 However, the NLRA situated these employees’
rights not as an end, but as a means to promote economic stability and
growth.13
12. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 (West 2011).
13. Senator Wagner, in a speech that was reprinted in the Senate record upon
introduction of the NLRA, stated: “If we intend to achieve the fundamental reforms of
the New Deal . . . . Our efforts should be directed, first toward providing the worker with
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Introduced in 1934 during the Great Depression, the NLRA sought
to prevent the “burdening or obstruct[ion of] commerce” by equalizing
the organization and bargaining powers between employees and
employers.14 When introducing the bill on the Senate floor, Senator
Robert Wagner, stated:
This [economic] situation cannot be remedied by new
codes or by general exhortations. It can be remedied
only when there is genuine cooperation between
employers and employees, on a basis of equal bargaining
power. The only road to this goal is the free and
unhampered
development
of
real
employee
organizations and their complete recognition. . . . It
should be guaranteed by enactment of the new
legislation which is being proposed today.15
This sentiment is captured in the introductory section of the NLRA,
which specifically acknowledges the importance of the equality between
employees and employers to national economic stability and growth:
Experience has proved that protection by law of the right
of employees to organize and bargain collectively
safeguards commerce from injury, impairment, or
interruption, and promotes the flow of commerce by
removing certain recognized sources of industrial strife
and unrest, by encouraging practices fundamental to the
friendly adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of
differences as to wages, hours, or other working
conditions, and by restoring equality of bargaining
power between employers and employees.16
Thus, the NLRA should be viewed not only as the legal
crystallization of the United States’ labor policy, but also the
an income sufficient for comfortable living, and then toward assuring him an equitable
share in our national wealth.” 78 CONG. REC. 3,678 (1934), supra note 1, at 19 (statement
of Sen. Wagner).
14. § 151. See also 78 CONG. REC. 3,443 (1934), supra note 1, at 15 (statement of
Sen. Wagner).
15. 78 CONG. REC. 3,443, supra note 1, at 17 (statement of Sen. Wagner).
16. § 151.
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fundamental means by which our government based its economic
recovery plan and ensured future economic stability and growth.17
In order to accomplish these greater goals, the NLRA provided that
employees shall have the right to self-organization, collective bargaining,
and other concerted activities.18 But these rights were limited to only
those the NLRA defined as employees.19 The NLRA first limited its
application to private-sector employees by excluding the United States
government and any state from the definition of employer.20 Second, the
NLRA defined employee as “any employee” except any “individual
employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any
family or person at his home, or any individual employed by his parent
or spouse.”21 Notably, the NLRA, as originally passed, did not

17. See 78 CONG. REC. 3,443-44 (1934), supra note 1, at 15-17; see generally supra
note 1 (relating the complete congressional purpose and history behind the NLRA).
President Franklin D. Roosevelt, upon signing the bill in 1935, stated:
By assuring the employees the right of collective bargaining it fosters
the development of the employment contract on a sound and
equitable basis. By providing an orderly procedure for determining
who is entitled to represent the employees, it aims to remove one of
the chief causes of wasteful economic strife.
79 Cong. Rec. 10,720 (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRB, supra note 1, at 3269 (statement of
Pres. Franklin D. Roosevelt).
18. § 157. In its entirety, the section provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from
any or all such activities except to the extent that such right may be
affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor
organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section
158(a)(3) of this title.
Id.
19. See § 152(3).
20. See § 152(2) (excluding “the United States . . . or any State or political
subdivision thereof” from the definition of employer, and thus, their employees from
coverage under the NLRA). See also Laura Midwood & Amy Vitacco, Note, The Right of
Attorneys to Unionize, Collectively Bargain, and Strike: Legal and Ethical
Considerations, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 299, 299 (2000).
21. § 152(3).
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distinguish between professional and non-professional employees.22

B. The Labor Management Relations Act of 1947: The TaftHartley Amendments
In 1947, Congress passed the Labor Management Relations Act
(LMRA), also known as the Taft-Hartley Act, which amended portions
of the NLRA.23 One significant amendment was the addition of a
definition for a professional employee.24 Section 2(12) of the NLRA
provides that a professional employee is
(a) [A]ny employee engaged in work (i)
predominantly intellectual and varied in character as
opposed to routine mental, manual, mechanical, or
physical work; (ii) involving the consistent exercise of
discretion and judgment in its performance; (iii) of such
a character that the output produced or the result
accomplished cannot be standardized in relation to a
given period of time; (iv) requiring knowledge of an
advanced type in a field of science or learning
customarily acquired by a prolonged course of
specialized intellectual instruction and study in an
institution of higher learning or a hospital, as
distinguished from a general academic education or from
an apprenticeship or from training in the performance of
routine mental, manual, or physical processes; or
(b) [A]ny employee, who (i) has completed the
courses of specialized intellectual instruction and study
described in clause (iv) of paragraph (a), and (ii) is
performing related work under the supervision of a
professional person to qualify himself to become a
professional employee as defined in paragraph (a).25
In amending the NLRA to include this definition, Congress
recognized a distinction between professional and non-professional
22.
23.
24.
25.

Midwood & Vitacco, supra note 20, at 301.
Id.
Id. at 302.
§ 152(12).
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employees while also explicitly ensuring that professional employees
were covered under the Act.26 In fact, Congress intended this definition
to “cover[] such persons as legal, engineering, scientific and medical
personnel together with their junior professional assistants.”27 Moreover,
the Report of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare noted:
When Congress passed the National Labor Relations
Act, it recognized that the community of interests among
members of a skilled craft might be quite different from
those of unskilled employees in mass-production
industry. Although there has been a trend in recent years
for manufacturing corporations to employ many
professional persons, including architects, engineers,
scientists, lawyers, and nurses, no corresponding
recognition was given by Congress to their special
problems. Nevertheless such employees have a great
community of interest in maintaining certain
professional standards . . . . Under the committee bill,
the Board is required to afford such groups an
opportunity to vote in a separate unit to ascertain
whether or not they wish to have a bargaining
representative of their own.28
Thus, the inclusion of professional employees in the NLRA reflects

26. See id.; 93 CONG. REC. 3,836 (1947) (statement of Sen. Taft), reprinted in 2
NLRB, LEGIS. HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT OF 1947, at 1009
(1948). Senator Taft specifically stated, in regards to the application of the NLRA to
professional employees:
Professional employees are defined to be those who are strictly
professional, men with highly specialized professional qualifications,
who may, if they desire, vote themselves out of a plant unit and
establish a special union for professional employees. Such a union
would have the protection of the Wagner Act. . . . It would mean that
the Board could not include professional employees with
nonprofessional employees if the majority of the professional
employees in a plant did not desire to be in the general union.
Id. See also Midwood & Vitacco, supra note 20, at 301.
27. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 80-510 (1947), reprinted in 1947 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1135,
1141.
28. S. REP. NO. 80-105 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, supra note 26, at 417.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss1/2

8

CHIN_Formatted_Finalv8

2012]

4/11/2012 7:31 PM

IMAGINING A PRIVATE ATTORNEYS’ UNION

85

a recognition that (1) professional employees may have different labor
interests than non-professional employees, (2) the right of employees to
organize and collectively bargain extends to professional employees
despite these different interests, and (3) the exercise of independent
discretion or judgment in one’s employment is not a per se barrier to
NLRA coverage.29
At the same time, however, the Taft-Hartley Act amended the
NRLA’s definition of employee to explicitly exclude supervisors, thus
denying coverage to any employee found to be a supervisor under the
statutory definition.30 A supervisor is defined as:
[A]ny individual having authority, in the interest of
the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall,
promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other
employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust
their grievances, or effectively to recommend such
action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise
of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical
nature, but requires the use of independent judgment.31
In justifying this amendment, Congress expressed concern about the
conflict of interest that would arise if a supervisor, who typically works
to further the interest of his or her employer, was expected to act with a
union against that employer’s interest.32 Accordingly, while the TaftHartley Amendments ensured that the NLRA explicitly covered
29. See id.; 29 U.S.C.A. § 152(12).
30. § 152(3) (explaining that the term “employee” would not encompass “any
individual employed as a supervisor.”).
31. § 152(11).
32. 93 CONG. REC. A2,010 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, supra note 26, at 868-69
(statement of Rep. Meade). More specifically, Congressman Meade remarked:
By definition, the new Board would be prohibited from setting
up a union to represent supervisory employees.
This section of the bill is an example of the old adage, “One
cannot serve two masters.” It would be an utterly impossible position
in which to place a man—he would be paid by his employer but he
[is] expected to go along with the union of which he was a member. I
am convinced the committee acted wisely in prohibiting unionization
of foremen or supervisors.
Id.
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professional employees, they also limited coverage by excluding
supervisors. 33 In effect, these particular amendments create a tension
between professional employees, who are statutorily allowed to organize,
and supervisors, who are often professional employees, but are barred by
statute from unionizing. This tension will be discussed further in Part III,
infra.

III. The White-Collar Professional and
the White-Collar Unionization Movement
“[The white-collar man] is more often pitiful than
tragic, as he is seen collectively, fighting impersonal
inflation, living out in slow misery his yearning for the
quick American climb. He is pushed by forces beyond his
control, pulled into movements he does not understand;
he gets into situations in which his is the most helpless
position. The white-collar man is the hero as victim, the
small creature who is acted upon but who does not act,
who works along unnoticed in somebody’s office or
store, never talking loud, never talking back, never
taking a stand.”
— C. Wright Mills, Sociologist (1951)34
Given that Congress explicitly allows professional employees to
organize and collectively bargain, this Part explores why such activities
would be appealing to white-collar professionals. It begins with an
exploration into the white-collar worker, specifically the white-collar
professional, as a distinct economic class. It identifies three
characteristics that serve to highlight the similarities and differences
between this class of workers and blue-collar workers. Lastly, it
introduces the white-collar unionization movement, drawing upon the
characteristics of the white-collar professional to describe its initial
impetus and argue for its continuation. It will also touch briefly on the
history of white-collar unionization in the United States and identify
existing white-collar unions.

33. § 152(11)-(12).
34. C. WRIGHT MILLS, WHITE COLLAR: THE AMERICAN MIDDLE CLASS, at xii
(1956).
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A. The White-Collar Professional
On a definitional level, the white-collar occupation group is broken
into four main sections: (1) professional, technical, and kindred workers;
(2) managers, officials, and proprietors, except farm; (3) clerical and
kindred workers; and (4) sales workers.35 For purposes of this Article,
one should note that the category of professional white-collar workers
consists of “lawyers, engineers, doctors, and teachers” as well as
“technicians . . . airline pilots, professional nurses (but not practical
nurses), and those employed as entertainers.”36 Common among these
professionals is the requirement of “specialized, systematic, and often
lengthy training.”37 As of 2006, there were almost thirty million whitecollar professions in the United States, with a projection that the number
would reach nearly thirty-five million by 2016, almost 21 percent of the
labor force.38
On a broader level, however, white-collar workers are a distinct
category of laborers that came to symbolize twentieth-century
existence.39 C. Wright Mills, a sociologist, conducted the most extensive
study of white-collar workers, and noted that “they are a new cast of
actors, performing the major routines of twentieth-century society.”40
Specifically, white-collar professionals are distinguishable from bluecollar workers in their education and occupational duties, but are also
remarkably similar to them because of an increased dependence on
employers as more and more white-collar professionals move into
salaried positions.41 The resulting quasi-independent nature of the whitecollar professional’s work led to the identification of three seemingly
contradictory characteristics inherent to this new class of workers: (1)
increased employment dependence despite being highly skilled; (2)

35. Everett M. Kassalow, White-Collar Unionism in the United States, in WHITECOLLAR TRADE UNIONS: CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS IN INDUSTRIALIZED SOCIETIES
305, 311 (Adolf Sturmthal ed., 1966).
36. Id. at 312.
37. MILLS, supra note 34, at 112.
38. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL
PROJECTIONS AND TRAINING DATA 45 (2008-09 ed.), available at http://www.bls.gov/emp
/optd/optd_archive.htm (download document in .pdf format and proceed to Table III-1 on
page 45).
39. MILLS, supra note 34, at ix (“[I]t is to this white-collar world that one must look
for much that is characteristic of twentieth-century existence.”).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 112.
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continued identification with management; and (3) a strong belief in
individual advancement. It is these three characteristics that led scholars
to speculate about the growth in white-collar unionization.

1. New Dependence
Because white-collar professionals, particularly doctors and
lawyers, have shifted toward salaried positions, these once independent
professionals are now increasingly dependent on their employers.42 Mills
observed:
Most professionals are now salaried employees . . .
and fitted into the new hierarchical organizations of
educated skill and service; intensive and narrow
specialization has replaced self-cultivation and wide
knowledge; assistants and sub-professionals perform
routine, although often intricate, tasks, while successful
professional men become more and more the managerial
type. So decisive have such shifts been, in some areas,
that it is as if rationality itself had been expropriated
from the individual and been located, as a new form of
brain power, in the ingenious bureaucracy itself.43
In other words, while old professionals used to “hang a shingle,” the
new white-collar professional sacrificed this independence to become
part of what Mills terms the “managerial demiurge”—“attached to
institutions” but never fully becoming “autonomous professionals
themselves.”44 This shift culminated in a new dependency in the
42. See id., at x (“In the established professions, the doctor, lawyer, engineer, once
was free and named on his own shingle; in the new white-collar world, the salaried
specialists of the clinic, the junior partners in the law factory, the captive engineers of the
corporation have begun to challenge free professional leadership.”).
43. Id. at 112.
44. Id. at 114. Mills observed:
Most of the old professionals have long been free practitioners;
most of the new ones have from their beginnings been salaried
employees. But the old professions, such as medicine and law, have
also been invaded by the managerial demiurge and surrounded by
sub-professionals and assistants. The other practitioner’s office is
thus supplanted by the medical clinic and the law factory, while
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workplace, resulting in professionals who no longer determined their
own work or practice.45 As a result, these white-collar professionals
occupy a hybrid position that maintains some of the entrepreneurship of
the old professional yet is subjected to the bureaucracy and dependency
that normally characterizes blue-collar workers.46
When this hybrid situation is applied to lawyers, Mills paints a
painfully accurate portrayal of contemporary associate life. He first sets
up a dichotomy in which he compares the lawyers of the nineteenthcentury, who were “agent[s] of the law, handling the general interests of
society,” with those of the twentieth-century, for whom “the public has
become . . . an object of profit rather than of obligation.”47 This shift in
focus has thus led to a fundamental change in the practice of law, giving
rise to large law firms, which transforms the lawyer from “a consultant
and counselor to large business” to “its servant, its champion, its ready
apologist.”48 Consequently, the modern corporation has led the lawyer to
newer professions and skills, such as engineering and advertising, are
directly involved in the new social organizations of salaried brain
power.
Id. at 113. Particularly, Mills noted that “[l]aw partners give their less challenging tasks
to clerks and salaried associates,” concluding that “[i]n practically every profession, the
managerial demiurge works to build ingenious bureaucracies of intellectual skills.” Id. at
115.
45. Id. at 114-15. Mills writes:
[P]rofessional men and women have become dependent upon the new
technical machinery and upon the great institutions within whose
routines the machines are located. They work in some department,
under some kind of manager; while their salaries are often high, they
are salaries, and the conditions of their work are laid down by rule.
What they work on is determined by others, even as they determine
how a host of sub-professionals assistants will work. Thus they
themselves become part of the managerial demiurge.
Id. at 114.
46. See id. at 115.
47. See id. at 121-22.
48. See id. at 122-23. Mills also observed:
The function of the law has been to shape the legal framework for the
new economy of the big corporation, with the split ownership and
control and the increased monopoly of economic power.
....
In fulfilling his function the successful lawyer has created his
office in the image of the corporations he has come to serve and
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erect a legal framework for the managerial demiurge.49
The result is essentially a “law factor[y],” where partners oversee
salaried associates, ensuring that “production lines and organization run
smoothly.”50 In turn, associates “work for only one important client or on
one type of problem” and “like a mechanic in a big auto repair shop,
[each salaried lawyer] is required to account for his time, in order that
fees may be assigned to given cases and the practice kept moving.” 51
This change in the practice of law and working conditions situates these
white-collar professionals closer to their blue-collar brethren than the old
independent professionals.52

2. Identification with Management
Despite the white-collar professionals’ new dependence on their
employer for work, they surprisingly maintain a close identification with
management.53 This may be because of the similarities between the
white-collar professional and his employer in terms of work and
education.54 Mills observed:

defend. Because of the increased load of the law business and the
concentration of successful practice, the law office has grown in size
beyond anything dreamed of by the nineteenth-century solicitor. Such
centralization of legal talent, in order that it may bear more closely
upon the central functions of the law, means that many individual
practitioners are kept on the fringes, while others become salaried
agents of those who are at the top. As the new business system
becomes specialized, with distinct sections and particular legal
problems of its own, so do lawyers become experts in distinct
sections and particular problems, pushing the interests of these
sections rather than standing outside the business system and serving
a law which co-ordinates the parts of a society.
Id. at 122.
49. Id. at 123.
50. See id. at 123-24.
51. Id. at 124.
52. See Kassalow, supra note 35, at 356 (“Under these conditions the special
individual characteristics of white-collar work tend to disappear and more of it becomes
routinized and bureaucratized.”); MILLS, supra note 34, at 301 (“Whatever their
aspirations, white-collar people have been pushed by twentieth-century facts toward the
wage-worker kind of organized economic life.”).
53. See Kassalow, supra note 35, at 356; MILLS, supra note 34, at 305.
54. See MILLS, supra note 34, at 305.
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[T]he technological and educational similarity of whitecollar work to the work of the boss; the physical
nearness to him; the prestige borrowed from him; the
rejection of wage-worker types of organization for
prestige reasons; the greater privileges and securities; the
hope of ascent—all these, when they exist, predispose
the white-collar employee to identify with the boss.55
In other words, the white-collar professional believes that the shared
similarities translate into shared interests.56 This belief, however, may
not be well-placed:
White-collar people may be part of management, like
they say, but management is a lot of things, not all of
them managing. You carry authority, but you are not its
source. . . . [Y]ou are a link in the chains of commands .
. . which bind together the men who make decisions and
the men who make things; without you the managerial
demiurge could not be. . . . You are closer to
management than the wage-workers are, but yours is
seldom the last decision.57
Despite the contemporary working conditions that characterize
white-collar occupations, there remains a loyalty to management.58

3. Belief in Personal Advancement
Lastly, the white-collar professional retains a strong belief in
personal advancement partly because of his identification with
management. Due to the nature of a white-collar professional’s work and
higher education, the white-collar professional, unlike the blue-collar
worker, possesses aspirations that “often take the form of a desire of

55. Id.
56. See id.
57. Id. at 80.
58. See id. at 305. Mills also observed that there may be “fear and even hatred of the
boss,” and that this “loyalty to management” could simply be an “insecure cover-up for
fear of reprisal.” Id.
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‘getting ahead’” as opposed to “getting by.”59 As a result, the whitecollar professional focuses on “upward orientation” and “fair channels of
promotion” rather than relying on organizing.60
In sum, these three characteristics demonstrate the complexity of the
white-collar professional and the inherent tensions that exist when
considering whether to unionize. On the one hand, white-collar
professionals are no longer independent workers—they increasingly rely
on employers for their work, leaving them in less control of their
working conditions, much like blue-collar workers. Thus, unionization is
the obvious solution to gain back control. On the other hand, the
similarities white-collar professionals share with their employers,
including education, responsibilities, and duties, create a sense of shared
interests, whether or not this is true. This sense coupled with the whitecollar professional’s belief in advancement—that is, his desire and belief
that, one day, he too could become the employer—decreases the
likelihood of unionization since the creation of a union would place him
directly adverse to his employer, thus impeding his ability to advance.
Despite this tension, however, there have been many successful attempts
to unionize white-collar professionals.

B. The White-Collar Unionization Movement
In 1957, the number of white-collar workers in the United States
surpassed that of blue-collar workers.61 This marked a genuine shift in
the labor market, and as the number of white-collar workers continued to
grow rapidly, many scholars in the following decades were left to
speculate about these new workers and their impact on the national labor
movement.62 As a result, many hypothesized that the increase in the

59. Kassalow, supra note 35, at 359 (“[T]he manual worker is more often likely to
be content with ‘getting by.’”).
60. See id. at 359-60.
61. Id. at 306; Kassalow also noted that the “United States is the first country in the
world in which manual or blue-collar workers have ceased to be the largest single
occupational groups of the labor force. They have been displaced . . . by white-collar
workers.” Id. at 305. See also MARK MCCOLLOCH, WHITE COLLAR WORKERS IN
TRANSITION 3 (1983) (“By the late 1950’s, [white-collar workers] outnumbered
production workers for the first time.”).
62. MCCOLLOCH, supra note 61, at 3. Kassalow, in particular, noted in another
piece that the increase in white collar workers arguably corresponded with the decline in
union membership. Everett M. Kassalow, Unionization of White-Collar Workers, in
LABOR IN A CHANGING AMERICA 158, 159 (William Haber ed., 1966).
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number of white-collar workers, the nature of the workers themselves,
and other social, economic, and technological shifts would eventually
lead to greater white-collar unionization.63
Although the call for greater white-collar unionization peaked in the
1970s, this did not mark the beginning of white-collar unions.64 In fact,
white-collar unions date back to the late nineteenth-century and the early
twentieth-century with the railroad, the government, and the
entertainment industry being the historical centers.65 In addition, during
the 1940s and 1960s, several professional associations transformed into
collective bargaining agents for their members.66 Today, there are
numerous unions for white-collar professionals, including but not limited
to doctors, nurses, musicians, actors, accountants, writers, and teachers.67
The impetus for the white-collar unionization movement arose from
several factors. First, the increase in the number of white-collar workers
contributed greatly to the movement. With the decline of blue-collar
workers, who traditionally formed the base of the labor movement, the
growing number of white-collar workers placed pressure on the labor
movement to adapt in order to survive.68 In addition, the labor history of
the United States, with its dependence on group bargaining, suggested
that an economic group as large as white-collar workers would
eventually seek its own channels of representation and influence.69
63. See Kassalow, supra note 35, at 305; MILLS, supra note 34, at 301-02.
64. See MCCOLLOCH, supra note 61, at 3; MILLS, supra note 34, at 302-03. For a
general discussion of the beginnings of white-collar unionism and identification of early
white-collar unions, please see Kassalow, supra note 35, at 318-29.
65. See Kassalow, supra note 62, at 163 (“[S]ignificant union organization among
postal employees, railway clerks, retail clerks and a few other white-collar groups goes
back many decades. Musicians, actors, artists, airline pilots, and journalists have also
been well unionized for years.”); Kassalow, supra note 35, at 318 (“Notable among the
early white-collar organizations at the end of the nineteenth and in the early twentieth
century were those of the government postal employees, the retail clerks, and the railway
clerks.”). See also MILLS, supra note 34, at 303.
66. Kassalow, supra note 35, at 351-53 (describing how the American Nurses
Association and the National Education Associations for years opposed unionization and
collective bargaining, but later modified themselves to become collective bargaining
agents).
67. For a better idea of the number and types of unions in existence, see Unions of
the AFL-CIO, AFL-CIO, http://www.aflcio.org/aboutus/unions/ (last visited Oct. 22,
2011) (a complete list of all unions affiliated with the AFL-CIO).
68. See Kassalow, supra note 62, at 159 (“The American labor movement, much
like labor movements in other industrial nations, has always based itself primarily on
manual workers, and it is now confronted with the fact that its base is eroding.”).
69. See id. at 162-63. More specifically, Kassalow opined:
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Second, the working conditions of white-collar workers may create an
incentive to unionize.70 As described earlier, the current conditions of the
white-collar workers’ employment have changed drastically from those
of old professionals so that they now closely mirror those of the bluecollar worker.71 The resulting bureaucracy and dependency leads to “a
specific kind of job dissatisfaction—the feeling that as an individual he
cannot get ahead in his work.”72 This ultimately creates “the job factor
that predisposes the white-collar employee to go pro-union.”73 Lastly, the
fact that white-collar workers are not immune from layoffs or salary cuts
gives further incentive to unionization.74 For instance, during the Great
Depression, white-collar workers faced unemployment just like bluecollar workers. A description of the circumstances faced then by whitecollar workers is astoundingly similar to those faced now by current
private law attorneys:

I am quite convinced that one way or another these “new
millions” in American economic life will demand and establish their
own channels of representation and influence. In a society which is
increasingly characterized by group bargaining and by group
consultation on the part of government, no major economic group
will long be without its organization form and channel.
Id.
70. See MILLS, supra note 34, at 304-05. Mills observed:
Objective circumstances of the work situation influence the
white-collar employees’ psychology when they are confronted with
the idea of joining a union. By and large, these are not different from
those affecting the organizability of wage-workers, and include:
strategic position in the technological or marketing processes of an
industry, which conditions bargaining power; unfair treatment by
employers, which creates a high state of grievance; a helpful legal
framework, which protects the right to organize; a profitable business
but one in which labor costs form a small proportion of the cost of
production, which means that higher wages will not severely affect
total costs; relative permanency of employment and of labor force, so
that organization may be stable.
Id.
71. See supra Part III.A.1.
72. MILLS, supra note 34, at 307.
73. Id.
74. See JÜRGEN KOCKA, WHITE COLLAR WORKERS IN AMERICA 1890-1940: A
SOCIAL-POLITICAL HISTORY IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 218 (Maura Kealey, trans.
1980).
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During the depression unemployment was a
common occurrence for white-collar workers in industry
as well as in commerce, though they were not as hard hit
as industrial blue-collar workers. Even if they kept their
jobs, however, the hours of office of technical
employees were often reduced when business was slow;
their wages were docked accordingly. Many firms also
attempted to cut down their office costs by more closely
supervising white collar workers, which further reduced
the small privileges and freedoms that separated the
office from the factory floor. . . . White collar employees
were also adversely affected by cutbacks in company
welfare policies: stock and profit sharing plans,
subsidized housing, savings banks, cafeterias and paid
vacations were often eliminated, and there were fewer
recreational and educational offerings.75
This uncertainty provides further motivation for white-collar
workers to act collectively to create more stable working conditions.76

IV. Objections to Private Attorneys Organizing and Responses
Given the growing similarities between the working conditions of
the white-collar professional and the traditional blue-collar worker, it is
not difficult to imagine a continuation of the white-collar unionization
movement. In particular, the impact of the economic downturn on
“Biglaw” may lead many associates to consider unionizing.77
Generally speaking, private attorneys maintain the same legal rights
to organize and collectively bargain as other employees.78 In fact, the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or the “Board”) has, since 1977,
asserted jurisdiction over law firms with gross revenue of five hundred

75. Id. at 218-19.
76. See Kassalow, supra note 62, 162-63; KOCKA, supra note 74, at 219.
77. In fact, the impetus for this Article was a conversation the Author had with a
junior associate at a prominent San Francisco law firm. Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Attorney
Labor Unions, N.Y. ST. B.J., Jan. 2007, at 23 n.1 (“There is no reason to believe that
attorneys would be less interested in joining unions than the American workforce in
general.”).
78. See Rubinstein, supra note 77.

19

CHIN_Formatted_Finalv8

96

4/11/2012 7:31 PM

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:1

thousand dollars.79 Since employees in law firms, including attorneys,
are subject to the NLRA, discussed supra, employers of private attorneys
may argue that attorneys are excluded from organizing because they are
confidential employees, supervisory employees, or managerial
employees. They may also argue that attorneys cannot unionize because
legal ethics will hinder collective bargaining efforts. This Part will
address each of these objections.

A. The Confidential Employee Exclusion
The Board has excluded from the definition of employee
“confidential employees.”80 The Supreme Court has identified two
categories of confidential employees that are excluded from the NLRA’s
protection: (1) employees that “assist and act in a confidential capacity to
persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate management policies
in the field of labor relations,” and (2) employees who “regularly have
access to confidential information concerning anticipated changes which
may result from collective-bargaining negotiations.”81 In other words,
here, the term confidential employees does not refer to the nature of the
employee’s work—that is, the confidential nature of an attorney’s work;
rather, it refers to those who are “involved in internal confidential labor
relations matters with respect to their employer.”82 Thus, in order to be
considered a confidential employee, the employee must “in the regular
course of [her] duties, have access to confidential data bearing directly
upon the employees’ labor relations.”83
The rationale for this exclusion is that management should not be
required to handle labor relations matters through an employee who is
represented by the union because of the risk that the employee will have
advance access to the company’s position regarding negotiations and
79. Foley, Hoag & Eliot, 229 N.L.R.B. 456 (1977).
80. E.g., NLRB v. Hendricks Cnty. Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170
(1981); Intermountain Rural Elec. Ass’n., 277 N.L.R.B. 1 (1985); Ford Motor Co., 66
N.L.R.B. 1317 (1946).
81. NLRB v. Meenan Oil Co., 139 F. 3d 311, 317 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting
Hendricks Cnty. Rural Elec., 454 U.S. at 189).
82. Id. (“[E]mployees who have access to confidential business information are not
for that reason excludible from collective-bargaining units.”). See also Rubinstein, supra
note 77, at 23.
83. Ford Motor Co., 66 N.L.R.B. at 1322; see also Meenan Oil Co., 139 F. 3d at
317 (“For this purpose, a confidential employee is one who has access to confidential
information that is labor-related.”).
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other matters.84 However, mere access to confidential information
regarding labor relations is insufficient to confer confidential status upon
an employee.85 As a result, the Board developed the “labor nexus” test,
which the Supreme Court approved in NLRB v. Hendricks Cnty. Rural
Elec. Membership Corp., to determine which employees are
confidential.86 The test asks whether the employee “assist[s] and act[s] in
a confidential capacity to persons who formulate, determine, and
effectuate management policies in the field of labor relations.”87 In this
way, the test focuses not on the access an employee has to confidential
labor management information, but on whether the employee works in a
confidential capacity with a person “who exercise[s] managerial
authority in labor relations.”88 As the Board stated:
Under [the labor nexus test] it is insufficient that an
employee may on occasion have access to certain labor
related or personnel type information. What is
contemplated instead is that a confidential employee is
involved in a close working relationship with an
individual who decides and effectuates management
labor policy and is entrusted with decisions and
information regarding this policy before it is made

84. Hendricks Cnty. Rural Elec., 454 U.S. at 179 (quoting Hoover Co., 55 N.L.R.B.
1321, 1323 (1944)). In full, the Supreme Court recognized:
Management should not be required to handle labor relations matters
through employees who are represented by the union with which the
[c]ompany is required to deal and who in the normal performance of
their duties may obtain advance information of the [c]ompany’s
position with regard to contract negotiations, the disposition of
grievances, and other labor relations matters.
Id. (alteration in original). See also Meenan Oil Co., 139 F. 3d at 318 (“An individual
who routinely sees data which would enable the union to predict, understand or evaluate
the bargaining position of the employer is therefore excluded from union membership.”).
85. Hendricks Cnty. Rural Elec., 454 U.S at 189 (“[T]he Board has never followed
a practice of depriving all employees who have access to confidential business
information from the full panoply of rights afforded by the Act.”).
86. See id at 190-91.
87. Id. at 173 (quoting Hendricks Cnty. Rural Corp., 236 N.L.R.B. 1616, 1619
(1978)).
88. Rubinstein, supra note 77, at 24 (citing Ford. Motor Co., 66 N.L.R.B. 1317,
1322 (1946)).
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known to those affected by it.89
The determination of whether an employee is a confidential
employee is often the subject of litigation and will necessarily be factspecific.90 In general, however, most attorneys in private law firms are
not involved with the labor management of the firms for which they
work and thus will not meet the labor nexus test.91 Consequently, most
private attorneys will not be prevented from organizing based upon the
exclusion of confidential employees.

B. The Supervisory Employee Exclusion
The greatest obstacle to private attorney unionization is probably
the statutory exclusion of supervisors, discussed supra. Given that even
the lowliest junior associate in a private law firm is entrusted with
supervising secretaries, paralegals, and other support staff, associates
may be considered “supervisors” under the NLRA, thus excluding them
from unionizing efforts.
The rationale for excluding supervisors from organizing rests with
Congress’s primary intent “to protect ‘laborers’ and ‘workers’ whose
right to organize and bargain collectively had not been recognized by
industry,” whereas “there was no similar history with respect to foremen,
managers, superintendents, or vice presidents.”92 Congress further noted
that attempts to unionize supervisors “hurt productivity, increased the
accident rate, upset the balance of power in collective bargaining, and
tended to blur the line between management and labor.”93 Congress also
found that “unionization of supervisors had deprived employers of the

89. Intermountain Rural Elec. Ass’n, 277 N.L.R.B. 1, 4 (1985), aff’d, Intermountain
Rural Elec. Ass’n v. NLRB, 1988 WL 166520 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S.
1046 (1989).
90. NLRB v. Meenan Oil Co., 139 F.3d 311, 317 (2d Cir. 1988) (“Status as a
confidential employee is a question of fact.”).
91. For example, most associate attorneys will not have access to projected wage
and salary data or be involved in the preparation of the law firm’s profit plan. See
Meenan Oil Co., 139 F.3d at 318-19 (holding that employees who helped prepare the
company’s profit plan and had access to projected wage and salary information were
confidential employees and could not be included in the collective-bargaining unit).
92. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 279 (1974) (citing Packard Motor
Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 496-97 (1947)).
93. Id. at 281 (citing S. REP. NO. 80-105, at 4 (1947)).
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loyal representations to which they were entitled.”94 In sum, Congress
was “concerned . . . with the welfare of ‘workers’ and ‘wage earners,’
not of the boss.”95
The burden of proving supervisory status falls on the party claiming
that the employee is a supervisor, which is usually the employer.96
However, not every “order giver” is a supervisor.97 The NLRA defines
supervisor as:
[A]ny individual having the authority, in the interest of
the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall,
promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other
employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust
their grievances, or effectively to recommend such
action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise
of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical
nature, but requires the use of independent judgment.98
Consequently, the Supreme Court, in NLRB v. Health Care &
Retirement Corp., described the test for determining whether an
employee is a supervisor as follows:
[T]he statute requires the resolution of three questions;
and each must be answered in the affirmative if an
employee is to be deemed a supervisor. First, does the
employee have authority to engage in 1 of the 12 listed
activities? Second, does the exercise of that authority
require “the use of independent judgment”? Third, does
the employee hold the authority “in the interest of the
employer?”99
94. Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 80-245, at 16-17 (1947)).
95. Id. at 282.
96. NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706, 710-12 (2001).
97. See King Broad. Co., 329 N.L.R.B. 378, 383 n.34 (1999) (citing NLRB v. Sec.
Guard Servs. 384 F.2d 143, 151 (5th Cir. 1967)). The King Broadcasting Co. decision
also noted that “it is well established that merely having the authority to assign work does
not establish statutory supervisory authority. Further, not every act of assignment
constitutes statutory supervisory authority.” Id. at 383 (citing Providence Hosp., 320
N.L.R.B. 717, 727 (1996)). See also Rubinstein, supra note 77, at 24 (citing NLRB v.
Sec. Guard Servs., 384 F.2d 143, 151 (5th Cir. 1967)).
98. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 152(11) (West 2011).
99. 511 U.S. 571, 573-74 (1994) (quoting Northcrest Nursing Home, 313 N.L.R.B.

23

CHIN_Formatted_Finalv8

100

4/11/2012 7:31 PM

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:1

Importantly, an employee need only engage in one of the twelve
listed activities in order to achieve supervisory status.100 However, any of
these actions must be done with “independent judgment” in order to
satisfy the test.101
In the case of attorneys seeking to organize, distinguishing
“independent judgment” from “professional judgment” is particularly
difficult.102 The Supreme Court addressed this difficulty when deciding
NLRB v. Kentucky River Community Care, Inc.103 There, the Supreme
Court was asked to consider whether the exercise of “ordinary
professional or technical judgment in directing less-skilled employees”
constituted the use of “independent judgment” for the purposes of
satisfying the test for supervisory status.104 Rejecting the “categorical
exclusion” of professional judgment from the understanding of
“independent judgment,” the Court found that “a supervisor’s judgment
[did not cease] to be ‘independent judgment’ because it depended upon
the supervisor’s professional or technical training or experience.”105 Yet,
the Court maintained that “[m]any nominally supervisory functions may
be performed without the ‘exercis[e of] such a degree of . . . judgment or
discretion . . . as would warrant a finding’ of supervisory status under the
Act,” noting that “the degree of judgment that might ordinarily be
required to conduct a particular task may be reduced below the statutory
threshold by detailed orders and regulations issued by the employer.”106
491, 493 (1993)).
100. E.g., Fred Meyer Alaska, Inc., 334 N.L.R.B. 646, 649 (2001) (“To meet this
definition, a person needs to possess only one of the specific criteria listed.”); King
Broad. Co., 329 N.L.R.B. at 381 (quoting Ohio Power Co. v. NLRB, 176 F.2d 385, 387
(6th Cir. 1949)) (“Section 2(11) is to be read in the disjunctive, and the ‘possession of
any one of the authorities listed in [that section] places the employee invested with this
authority in the supervisory class.’”) (alteration in original).
101. See King Broad. Co., 329 N.L.R.B. at 381 (“As with every supervisory indicia,
assignment must be done with independent judgment before it is considered to be
supervisory under Section 2(11).”).
102. See id. at 383 (citing Providence Hosp., 320 N.L.R.B. at 730 (1996) (“We
recognize that it is often difficult to separate the exercise of judgment necessary to the
performance of an individual’s own job from the supervisory independent judgment of
Section 2(11) of the Act, particularly where skilled employees are directing other skilled
employees, or professional employees are direction nonprofessional employees.”).
103. 532 U.S. 706 (2001).
104. See id at 713 (quoting Pet’r’s Br. at 11).
105. Id. at 714-15.
106. Id. at 713-14 (quoting Weyerhauser Timber Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 1170, 1173
(1949)). See also King Broad. Co., 329 N.L.R.B. at 383 (Noting that “the authority of an

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss1/2

24

CHIN_Formatted_Finalv8

2012]

4/11/2012 7:31 PM

IMAGINING A PRIVATE ATTORNEYS’ UNION

101

How this affects the bargaining status of law firm associates remains
terribly unclear, but it suggests that if an associate’s directions to support
staff fall within the orders of a partner, the associate may not rise to the
level of statutory supervisory status.107
In 2006, the Board, in Oakwood Healthcare Inc., considered
whether charge nurses were supervisors under the NLRA.108 In deciding
the case, the Board attempted to clarify the terms “assign,” “responsibly
to direct,” and “independent judgment” as used in the statutory definition
of supervisor.109 These definitional clarifications are particularly
important to attorneys who desire to organize because their employers
will probably assert that they assign or responsibly direct others with
independent judgment in order to exclude them from any bargaining unit.
Regarding the term “assign,” the Board explained that it
[R]efer[red] to the act of designating an employee to a
place (such as a location, department, or wing),
appointing an employee to a time (such as a shift or
overtime period), or giving significant overall duties,
i.e., tasks, to an employee. That is, the place, time, and
work of an employee are part of his/her terms and
conditions of employment.110
The Board went further to distinguish the “designation of significant
overall duties” from “ad hoc instructions that the employee perform a
discrete task,” stating that the NLRA’s use of “assign” referred to the
former rather than the latter.111
individual employee to direct another to perform discrete tasks stemming from the
directing employee’s experience, skills, training, or position is not supervisory authority.
In these circumstances, such directions simply are incidental to the employee’s ability to
perform their own work.”).
107. See Ky. River Cmty. Care, 532 U.S. at 713-14. See also King Broad. Co., 329
N.L.R.B. at 383. In King Broadcasting Co., the Board found that news producers were
not supervisors because “the relationship of the producers to other news department
employees is not supervisory, but rather, is one of coworkers involved in separate but
sequential functions in the development of a single product.” Id. at 383. It could be
argued that the relationship between associates and support staff is similar to that of the
employees in King Broadcasting Co., in that associates and support staff are merely
doing sequential functions with the end goal of creating a single product.
108. 348 N.L.R.B. 686 (2006).
109. Id. at 688-94.
110. Id. at 689.
111. Id.
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However, in clarifying the term “responsibly to direct,” the Board
found that this term did include ad hoc instructions.112 Asserting that
“responsibly to direct” is not limited to “department heads,” the Board
stated, “If a person on the shop floor has ‘men under him,’ and if that
person decides ‘what job shall be undertaken next or who shall do it,’
that person is a supervisor provided that the direction is both
‘responsible’ . . . and carried out with independent judgment.”113 The
Board went on to define “responsible,” holding:
For direction to be “responsible,” the person directing
and performing the oversight of the employee must be
accountable for the performance of the task by the other,
such that some adverse consequence may befall the one
providing the oversight if the tasks performed by the
employee are not performed properly. . . .
Thus . . . it must be shown that the employer
delegated to the putative supervisor the authority to
direct the work and the authority to take corrective
action, if necessary. It also must be shown that there is a
prospect of adverse consequences for the putative
supervisor if he/she does not take these steps.114
In other words, for the term “responsibly to direct,” the Board, in
order to distinguish between supervisors and non-supervisors, looks not
only to the content of the directive (that is, overall duties versus ad hoc
instructions), but also whether the order-giver can be held accountable
for failure to perform the directive correctly.115
Lastly, the Board’s decision in Oakwood affirmed that any
supervisory act must be done with “independent judgment” and further
defined the term.116 It stated, “to exercise ‘independent judgment’ an
individual must at minimum act, or effectively recommend action, free of
the control of others and form an opinion or evaluation by discerning and
112. See id. at 691.
113. Id. (quoting NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706, 714 (2001)).
114. Id. at 691-92.
115. Id. at 692 (“[T]he concept of accountability creates a clear distinction between
those employees whose interest, in directing other employees’ tasks, align with
management from those whose interests, in directing other employees, is simply the
completion of a certain task.”).
116. Id. at 695-98.
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comparing data” and that “judgment is not independent if it is dictated or
controlled by detailed instructions, whether set forth in company policies
or rules, the verbal instructions of higher authority, or in the provisions
of a collective bargaining agreement.”117 In this way, the Board affirmed
the Supreme Court’s definition of “independent judgment” in Kentucky
River.118 When applying this definition to the terms “assign” and
“responsibly to direct,” the Board did note that “[i]t may happen that an
individual’s assignment or responsible direction of another will be based
on independent judgment within the dictionary definitions of those terms,
but still not rise above the merely routine or clerical.”119 The Board failed
to explain what this exactly means, leaving room for further clarification
and development in this area of law.
Since the Board’s decision in Oakwood, only the Second Circuit has
had the opportunity to extensively apply Oakwood when deciding
whether employees are supervisors under the NLRA. In NLRB v. Atlantic
Paratrans of New York City, Inc., the court considered whether
dispatchers were supervisors under the NLRA, and thus, not protected.120
The court first considered whether the dispatchers exercised
“independent judgment” when assigning drivers to their routes.121 The
court observed that many routes were pre-assigned, and to the extent that
some routes had to be reassigned, the dispatchers considered factors that
were “largely mechanical and geographical; and [did] not rest on
considerations of the skill of the drivers.122 Consequently, the Second
Circuit found “that evaluating and comparing data is not always
sufficient [to achieve supervisory status] because it may be routine and
clerical in nature,” thus affirming Oakwood’s requirement that judgment
must be free from outside control or instructions in order to be
independent.123
The court then looked at whether the dispatchers could be found to
“responsibly to direct” others such that they would face “some adverse
consequence . . . if the tasks performed . . . are not performed
properly.”124 The court found that there were no instances of dispatchers
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. at 692-93.
See supra text accompanying note 104.
Oakwood Healthcare Inc., 348 N.L.R.B. at 693.
300 F. App’x 54, 55 (2d Cir. 2008).
Id.
Id. at 56.
Id. (citing Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 348 N.L.R.B. at 693).
Id. at 57 (quoting Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 348 N.L.R.B. at 691).
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being warned that they would be disciplined or actually being punished
for drivers’ misconduct or their failure to perform their jobs properly. 125
Additionally, the court noted that dispatchers had no authority to
discipline or recommend discipline for drivers, despite “uncontested”
evidence that they write up incidents, testify at disciplinary hearings, and
are present when supervisors provide warnings to drivers.126 As a result,
the court ruled that the dispatchers simply “give . . . information” rather
than “effective recommendations,” “which is not sufficient for
supervisory authority.”127
Indeed, the Second Circuit’s application of Oakwood in Atlantic
demonstrates that employees who manage others in accordance with set
procedures and who play a limited role in the discipline of those they
allegedly supervise will not be found sufficiently supervisory so that they
are excluded from protection. While the supervisory exclusion poses the
most significant obstacle to private attorney organizing, the above
analysis suggests that the law governing supervisors continues to
develop. The greatest concern regarding the attempts to clarify the
supervisory exclusion is that the exclusion may eventually swallow the
NLRA’s application to professional employees.128
Ultimately, some attorneys will be found to be supervisors, but
many will not. Like determining which employees are confidential, the
inquiry into whether an associate is a supervisor will be fact-specific, and
any attorneys interested in organizing will want to examine their
situation in accordance with the developing law.129

C. The Managerial Employee Exclusion
The final exclusion that an employer may use in order to prevent
attorneys from organizing is the managerial exclusion, which was
developed by the NLRB and the Supreme Court through case law.130
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 348 N.L.R.B. at 700 (dissenting opinion) (the
dissenting members of the NRLB voiced concern that the “decision threaten[ed] to create
a new class of workers under Federal labor law: workers who have neither the genuine
prerogatives of management, nor the statutory rights of ordinary employees.”).
129. See Rubinstein, supra note 77, at 26.
130. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 275 (1974) (“The Wagner
Act . . . did not expressly mention the term ‘managerial employee.’ After the Act’s
passage, however, the Board developed the concept of ‘managerial’ employee in a series
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However, the rationale for this exclusion rests primarily on Congress’s
intent “to exclude from the protections of the Act all employees properly
classified as ‘managerial.’”131 Thus, the exclusion acts “[t]o ensure that
employees who exercise discretionary authority on behalf of the
employer will not divide their loyalty between employer and union.”132
In Bell Aerospace Co., the Supreme Court defined managerial
employees as “executives who formulate and effectuate management
policies by expressing and making operative decisions of their
employer.”133 Here, the test of whether an employee is managerial is
whether “he represents management interests by taking or recommending
discretionary actions that effectively control or implement employer
policy.”134 In other words, managerial employees are employees who are
aligned with management and have the discretion to act either within or
independently of established employer policy.135 In order for an
employee “to be aligned with management, the employee’s duties must
be ‘outside the scope of duties routinely performed by a similarly
situated professional.’”136 As such, “routine discharge of professional
duties” does not confer managerial status upon an employee because
these duties do not fall “outside the scope of the duties routinely
performed by similarly situated professionals.”137
Like the other exclusions, making such a determination will be factintensive. However, most associates will likely not fall into this
exclusion mainly because they have no effect on the management of the
law firms that employ them.138 As such, they generally cannot be

of cases involving the appropriateness of bargaining units.”).
131. Id. at 275. See also NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 680 (1980) (“The
Act was intended to accommodate the type of management-employee relations that
prevail in the pyramidal hierarchies of private industry.”).
132. Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 687-88.
133. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. at 286.
134. Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 683 (citing Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. at 274, 286-89;
Sutter Cmty. Hosps., 227 N.L.R.B. 181, 193 (1976); Bell Aerospace, 219 N.L.R.B. 384,
385-86 (1975); Gen. Dynamics Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. 851, 857-58 (1974)).
135. See id.
136. Id. at 690. See also Nurses United for Improved Patient Healthcare, 338
N.L.R.B. 837, 840 (2003).
137. See Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 690.
138. See id. at 690 n.30 (“For this reason, architects and engineers functioning as
project captains for work performed by teams of professionals are deemed employees
despite substantial planning responsibility and authority to direct and evaluate team
members.”). This reasoning should apply no differently to private attorneys employed at
law firms.
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excluded from organizing based on the managerial exclusion.

D. Attorney Professional Responsibilities
Lastly, employers may attempt to prevent attorneys from unionizing
by asserting that such organization violates the professional
responsibilities of attorneys. This Part will discuss these concerns and
address any ethical considerations that may hinder a private attorney’s
ability to organize.
In 1967, prior to the adoption of the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility (the “Model Code”), the American Bar Association
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility (the “Committee”)
determined that salaried employee-attorneys may join a union that is
limited to other lawyers who are employed by the same employer for the
purpose of negotiating wages, hours, and working conditions.139 The
Committee, however, found that “such a lawyer would not have the right
to strike, to withhold services for any reasons, to divulge confidences or
engage in any other activities . . . which would violate any Canon [of
Ethics].”140 The Committee also stated that lawyers interested in
unionizing should not join any union with non-attorneys.141
After the Model Code was adopted, the Committee once again
addressed the ethical concern of attorneys forming or joining unions. In
Informal Opinion 1325, the Committee wrote that “[t]he Code of
Professional Responsibility contain[ed] no Disciplinary Rule that
specifically prohibits membership by lawyers in unions or associations
representing lawyers,” noting specifically that “lawyers are not forbidden
per se to belong to unions, whether or not the union membership is
limited to lawyers.”142 The Committee then pointed to provision EC 5-13
in the Code of Professional Responsibility as providing “ethical
guidance.”143 EC 5-13 states:
A lawyer should not maintain membership in or be
influenced by any organization of employees that

139. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 986 (1967).
140. Id. (stating also that “strikes, picketing, boycotts and any type of withholding
of services (including the non-passage of picket lines) should be expressly prohibited.”).
141. Id.
142. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 1325 (1975).
143. Id.
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undertakes to prescribe, direct, or suggest when or how
he should fulfill his professional obligations to a person
or organization that employs him as a lawyer. Although
it is not necessarily improper for a lawyer employed by a
corporation or similar entity to be a member of an
organization of employees, he should be vigilant to
safeguard his fidelity as a lawyer to his employer, free
from outside influences.144
The Committee acknowledged that while EC 5-13 “mentions no
Disciplinary Rule specifically,” the primary concern is that a unionized
lawyer may “be confronted with a choice between acquiescing or
assisting in certain union activities and violating certain Disciplinary
Rules” such as neglecting a legal matter, intentionally failing to carry out
an employment contract with a client, or intentionally prejudicing or
damaging one’s client.145 The Committee went on to note that, in some
instances, participating in union activities may cause an attorney to
neglect her duties, but this is not necessarily the case in every
circumstance.146 In fact, it specifically observed, “participation in a strike
might be no more disruptive of the performance of legal work than
taking a two week’s vacation might be.”147 Ultimately, the Committee
found that it would be “idle speculation” to determine which other
Disciplinary Rules may be violated if a lawyer participated in union
activities.148 The Committee simply stated:
Lawyers who are union members are required, the same
as all other lawyers, to comply with all Disciplinary
Rules at all times; and lawyers who are union members
should not permit the organization to prescribe, direct or
suggest how to fulfill one’s professional obligations, but
should be vigilant at all times to safeguard one’s fidelity
to employer free from outside influences.149

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-13 (1983).
Informal Op. 1325, supra note 142.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Consequently, the Board has routinely dismissed arguments that the
professional responsibilities of lawyers prevent them from unionizing.150

V.

Imagining a Private Attorney Union

Given the absence of a complete bar to private attorney
unionization, this Part endeavors to lay out, generally, how a private
attorneys’ union may be formed and address the practical concerns such
unions may encounter. This Part is by no means thorough, and should be
considered a starting point rather than a how-to guide.

A. General Procedure for Establishing Representation
Like any other employees that wish to form a union for the purpose
of collective bargaining, attorneys will have to follow the typical
statutory procedure.151 Generally, attorneys interested in unionizing will
have to submit to the Board an election petition and a “showing of
interest,” which must come from 30 percent of the employees in the
bargaining unit.152 This is normally achieved by signed authorization
cards.153 Afterwards, a regional field examiner or attorney will
investigate the petition.154 A hearing will then be conducted in order to
create a full record as to jurisdiction, appropriate unit, representation, and
timeliness, and the hearing officer will then forward a report
summarizing and analyzing the issues to the regional director.155 The
regional director will then make a decision as to the disputed matters,
and either order elections or dismiss the petition.156

150. See, e.g., Foley, Hoag & Eliot, 229 N.L.R.B. 456 (1977).
151. The Author assumes that employers of private attorneys will not voluntarily
acknowledge the existence of a bargaining unit and recognize a union as the
representative for employees in that unit. This seems to be a fair assumption given that
almost all employers challenge their employees unionizing efforts. As such, the
procedure laid out in this section will assume no voluntary recognition.
152. ROBERT A. GORMAN & MATTHEW W. FINKIN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW:
UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 55 (2d ed. 2004). See also National Labor
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 159 (West 2011); Investigations of Petition Rule, 29 C.F.R.
101.18(a) (2011).
153. GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 152, at 55.
154. Id. at 56.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 57.
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B. The Bargaining Unit
Given the procedure explained above, determining the bargaining
unit will be crucial to ensuring the success of attorneys who want to
unionize. Generally, the Board looks for “an employee group which is
united by community of interest.”157 In other words, the bargaining unit
should “neither embrace[] employees [who have] a substantial conflict of
economic interest nor omit[] employees sharing a unity of economic
interest with other employees in the bargaining . . . constituency.”158
Because of this “community of interest” standard, attorneys will
want to think carefully about those they wish to include in their union.
First, because each law firm has a different internal employee structure,
with some variation across offices, private attorneys will probably want
to organize by law firm, and in some instances, by office. Second,
attorneys should probably avoid joining existing unions created by
support staff and paralegals. Instead, they should create their own
attorney-only union.159 This will ensure that the “community of interest”
standard is met and help avoid any ethical issues. Lastly, organizing
attorneys will want to be cognizant of the statutory and judicially created
exceptions to the definition of employee in the NLRA. For example,
while many new associates and junior associates may not fall into the
supervisory exclusion, mid-level and senior associates may well be
excluded from organizing and bargaining because of their increased

157. Id. at 87. The Board may also consider the following factors:
(1) [S]imilarity in the scale and manner of determining earnings; (2)
similarity in employment benefits, hours of work and other terms and
conditions of employment; (3) similarity in the kind of work
performed; (4) similarity in the qualifications, skills and training of
the employees; (5) frequency of contact or interchange among the
employees; (6) geographic proximity; (7) continuity or integration of
production processes; (8) common supervision and determination of
labor-relations policy; (9) relationship to the administrative
organization of the employer; (10) history of collective bargaining;
(11) desires of the affected employees; (12) extent of union
organization.
Id. at 87-88.
158. Id. at 87.
159. See, e.g., Wayne Cnty. Neighborhood Legal Servs. Inc., 229 N.L.R.B. 1023,
1024 (1977) (finding all attorneys constituted an appropriate bargaining unit, excluding
paralegals, secretaries, law students, and investigators).
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responsibilities.160

C. Scope of Collective Bargaining
The original version of the NLRA did not specifically define the
scope of collective bargaining. However, with the addition of the TaftHartley Amendments, the Act now requires that employers and
representatives of the employees meet and confer “in good faith with
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment.”161 In addition, there may be “areas of special concern to
white collar workers.”162 These areas may include “better vacations and
sick leave plans” and “more interest in insurance and stock-sharing
programs.”163 Indeed, blue-collar worker unions have normally bargained
for issues such as better vacation and sick leave.164 Ultimately, there is no
reason to think that there will be significant differences between the
agreements negotiated by white-collar groups and those negotiated by
blue-collar groups.165

D. Concerted Activities
For many, the right to strike is fundamental to those that unionize.
In fact, the right to organize may have little significance absent the
ability to strike.166 As explained previously, engaging in a strike may
pose particular ethical considerations for unionizing attorneys.167 In
addition, striking may be particularly difficult in light of the Supreme
Court’s decision in FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association.168
There, the Court held that a strike by court-appointed attorneys violated
federal antitrust laws.169 Specifically, it found that the attorneys’ efforts
to obtain higher wages through “concerted refusal” was the “essence of

160. See id. (finding also that supervisory attorneys should be excluded from the
bargaining unit).
161. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(d) (West 2011).
162. Kassalow, supra note 35, at 362.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Midwood & Vitacco, supra note 20, at 322.
167. See infra Part III.D.
168. 493 U.S. 411 (1990).
169. Id. at 422.
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‘price-fixing,’” thus violating section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act.170 Whether this case will reach beyond court-appointed attorneys
remains unclear.
Assuming, however, that an attorney strike may raise antitrust
concerns, there may be other ways for attorneys to engage in concerted
activities or, at the very least, modify their strike practices. For example,
attorneys could provide advanced notice of their intent to strike, similar
to the statutory requirement for organized healthcare professionals. 171
Additionally, a private attorney union could voluntarily adopt a no-strike
policy and embrace some form of arbitration to ensure that a resolution is
reached when there is an impasse in bargaining.172 For instance, some
professional unions, including nurses and engineers, have adopted strong
positions against strikes, and interest arbitration has been used for police
officers and firefighters as an alternative to striking.173 Interest
arbitration, specifically, allows employers and employees to resort to an
independent mediator, who, based on a fact-finding examination, issues a
report resolving any disputes that cannot be settled during bargaining.174
In fact, interest arbitration has been included in the Employee Free
Choice Act (EFCA), a proposed bill that would amend the NLRA in
order to streamline the union certification process.175 In the end, there
remain viable strategies to allow attorneys to engage in concerted
activities, despite the concerns surrounding the ability of private
attorneys to strike.

VI. Conclusion
Current conditions may be ripe for private attorney unionizing. The
170. Id. at 423 (quoting Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n v. FTC, 856 F.2d 226,
234 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). For a greater discussion of this case, see Midwood & Vitacco,
supra note 20, at 322-25.
171. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A § 158(g) (West 2011).
172. See Kassalow, supra note 35, at 363; Midwood & Vitacco, supra note 20, at
329-30.
173. See Kassalow, supra note 35, at 363; Midwood & Vitacco, supra note 20, at
329 (citing N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 209(2) (McKinney 1999)).
174. See Midwood & Vitacco, supra note 20, at 329-30 (citing N.Y. CIV. SERV.
LAW § 209(2) (McKinney 1999)). See also Mandatory First Contract Interest
Arbitration, JACKSON LEWIS LLP (Sept. 30, 2008), http://www.jacksonlewis.com/legalup
dates/article.cfm?aid=1511.
175. Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, S. 560, 111th Cong. § 3 (2009); Employee
Free Choice Act of 2009, H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. § 3 (2009). See also JACKSON LEWIS
LLP , supra note 174.
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threat of a double-dip recession coupled with the legal industry’s massive
layoffs, compensation restructuring, and overall slow recovery has left
private attorneys just as vulnerable as their blue-collar brethren.176 It is
this type of job uncertainty that makes the prospect of organizing
appealing.177
In fact, there have been both legislative and regulatory efforts to
amend the NLRA to appeal to today’s workers. For example, the EFCA,
a bill that was introduced in the 111th Congress, would have made
organizing especially attractive to white-collar workers because it would
streamline the lengthy election process.178 President Barack Obama
publicly stated his support for the bill.179 Although the bill never came to
a vote, this legislation is expected to be reintroduced in the current 112th
Congress.180 Most recently, on June 21, 2011, the NLRB proposed
regulatory reforms similar to those contained in the EFCA that would
likewise streamline pre- and post-election procedures.181
Just as the NLRA provided answers at the time of the Great

176. See James B. Kelleher, White-Collar Blues Play Well with U.S. Labor Unions,
REUTERS, Jan. 29, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE50R6MU2
0090128. In fact, there has already been speculation on how the current market slides will
affect the legal industry. See also David Lat, Are We Entering a Double-Dip Recession?
If So, What Should We Do?, ABOVE LAW (Aug. 9, 2011, 10:19 AM),
http://abovethelaw.com/2011/08/are-we-entering-a-double-dip-recession-if-so-how-canla
w-firms-respond/.
177. Kelleher, supra note 176. Kelleher offers a quote from Harley Sheiken, a
professor at the University of California, Berkeley, on the issue:
There's something new in the air. . . . There is a sense that whitecollar workers have become the blue-collar workers of the 21st
century in terms of job security, wages and benefits. That's certainly
how they're treated. And if you're treated like a blue-collar worker,
you may respond like a blue-collar worker and seek to protect
benefits and maintain some job security.
Id.
178. See S. 560 § 2; H.R. 1409 § 2; Kelleher, supra note 176 (explaining that “[i]f
the more low-key, petition-like approach allowed under the proposed EFCA passes, [it]
would be much more suited for (white-collar) tastes.”) (internal quotation marks
omitted); JON O. SHIMABUKURO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 21887, THE EMPLOYEE FREE
CHOICE ACT 1-3 (2011), available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/key_workplace
/783.
179. Kelleher, supra note 176.
180. SHIMABUKURO, supra note 178, at 7.
181. Proposed Amendments to NLRB Election Rules and Regulations Fact Sheet,
NLRB, http://www.nlrb.gov/node/525 (last visited Oct. 25, 2011).
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Depression, it may now hold answers for those who have found the legal
industry’s response to the Great Recession unsatisfying. As law firms
continue to adjust to a new economic reality, associates should be asking
themselves whether they are willing to risk living through another 2009
with all its uncertainties and unpredictability. Indeed, associates may
want to consider the words Senator Robert Wagner spoke when
introducing the NLRA to the Senate:
The time has come to ask: Where are we
progressing? Are we content to return to the uneven
prosperity of the nineteen twenties, with its poverty, its
uncertainty, and its seeds of recurrent depressions? Or
are we prepared to lay the solid foundations for a saner
and happier mode of economic life?182
Today, the questions remain, but now the answers depend on associates.

182. 78 Cong. Rec. 3,678 (1934), supra note 1, at 18 (statement by Sen. Wagner).
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